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Necessary Monsters
REBECCA TUSHNET*
As I listened to various participants at the Mashup/Remix
Conference, one question was often repeated: does remix matter?
In this brief, rather freewheeling comment, I want to address this
question on two levels. The first level is the critique of importance:
isn't mass culture still ahead of remix culture in importance? After all,
video remixers are generally drawing from mass-produced TV and
movies, bloggers citing the New York Times, and so on. Jack Balkin
has offered a rousing defense of the value of linking, commenting,
quoting, and otherwise piling on that I will not here repeat in any
detail., The "long tail" of communication allows people to find the
content that is most suited to their particular interests, improving the
quality of the information environment for themselves even if other
people don't care about the same people, books, or events. On the
other side of the equation, there are important questions about the
extent to which mass culture is, or ever was, mass: the most popular
TV shows are watched by an ever-shrinking fraction of the population,
and, since we started measuring such things, it's been clear that
African-American popular media, for example, are different from
white American popular media.2
0 Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to participants at the Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law Mashup/Remix Conference, and particularly to Francesca
Coppa for helpful discussions.
l See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory ofFreedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
2 See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 431 nl.104 (2000) (detailing racial
differences in top-rated television shows, popular magazines, internet access, and popular
books).
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But the deeper question is the Meiklejohnian one of the
appropriate subjects of civic concern: does pop culture matter? So
what if people post their funny South Park remixes online?3 I come at
this from a background in media fandom-this is comprised of largely
female communities whose members create and enjoy new works
based on mass media texts, often focusing on sexuality and gender
roles. Media fandom is far from united, and many of its productions
aren't feminist by anyone's definition. However, in its focus on
women's interests and women's pleasures it at least offers some
options rarely available in commercial mass media. My background
assumption is that pop culture matters because it offers people so
many prominent lessons in how to live and what to value. This is also
why remix matters: it allows people to adopt, modify, reject, question,
and otherwise react to those lessons.
As a broader answer to the question of significance, I want to
suggest that remix is the basic human condition. We are born, after
all, with mixtures of our parents' genes. That heritage is more or less
apparent, more or less salient, depending on individual characteristics
and depending on the purposes for which we're investigating
relationships between persons. The same is true of the works we
create.
Mashup can appear as a kind of Frankenstein's monster: notable
for its stuttering gait, its not-quite-rightness compared to naturally
(i.e. professionally) produced content.4 In some sense, it's striking
that it walks or entertains at all. Being stitched together means that a
31 think people who affirmatively argue that pop culture is unimportant, compared to the
real challenges we face today, are often proceeding in bad faith. Very few of them are more
actively combating genocide in Rwanda, or whatever the more important thing is, than
their interlocutors. Certainly such critics rarely ask whether a person invested in pop
culture can also be doing other things in the world.
4 For an extreme view that creativity is beside the point and mass production is the only
value worth pursuing, consider the British government's vision statement for the digital
economy: the government intends to seek "a digital framework for the creative industries
and a commitment to the creative industries grounded in the belief that they can be scaled
and industrialised in the same way as other successful high-technology, knowledge
industries." United Kingdom Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform,
Digital Britain-Final Report, June 2009, at 105, available at
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/digitalbritain-finalreport-junog.pdf. Are
movies-even summer blockbuster movies-really just like transistors, products ideally to
be stamped out on an assembly line? If we disagree, and want to insist on the human
element even in our scaled-up consumer culture, then I would suggest that we should
honor, rather than try to eliminate, the messiness and inevitable differences we find in
varying creative works.
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work (or a monster) wears its antecedents on its outsides, rather than
having its family tree be the kind of thing that can easily be set aside.
We can forget, at least for a while, that "original" works always have
sources. But the remix does not allow us the illusion that we are
dealing only with an individual-self-produced and independent. This
is reassuring for some people while discomfiting for others.
This stitched-together quality of the mashup has echoes in the
legal analysis of remix, which generally proceeds under the copyright's
rubric of fair use. Two axes of discussion loom largest in the fair use
analysis: commerciality and transformativeness. In both areas, the
conventional legal definitions are a poor fit in the context of many
remixes. This is especially true when remixes are created by fans of
the original, who are creating at least in part because they love (and
sometimes love-hate) the existing work.
I will begin with commerciality, which is probably even more
fraught than transformativeness. This is because many copyright
owners who are willing to litigate perceived infringement care more
about money than about being remixed. Copyright law has an
expansive and perhaps all-encompassing definition of commerciality;
sometimes "commercial" use includes sharing files for free, as the
district court and the court of appeals held in the Napster case.5 Like
Napster, YouTube is a commercial venture. But commercial for
whom? The people uploading videos are doing it for free, and most
have no hope or intent of making money. For purposes of a fair use
analysis of content uploaded by an individual creator, the commercial
hopes of the conduit hosting the content shouldn't be the key to a fair
use analysis, any more than a paint store's receipt of money for paint
and canvas makes all painting commercial. As I have argued
elsewhere, people who create with no hope of monetary reward make
different things than people who want to participate in the money
economy, which justifies special fair use treatment for freely shared
remixes.6
More generally, commercial and noncommercial spaces
interpenetrate, and cannot readily be disentangled. Fans generally
don't make money from fandom; particularly in female-dominated
media fandoms, there is a strong norm against anything that smacks
of commercialization. This is thought to be both legally and ethically
5 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F-3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
6 Rebecca Thshnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008).
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protective: fans argue that they are good consumers and that their
fandom encourages them to buy more of the official product. This
position, however, entails that other people and entities-
professionals, convention organizers, Google-regularly do make
money from fans. Abigail De Kosnik has therefore asked whether we
should retreat from fan culture's valorization of noncommerciality:
fans are only noncommercial in a particular sense, and that sense is
that if there is any money on the table, it certainly won't be flowing
towards the fans.7
As De Kosnik's analysis makes clear, there are at least two relevant
positions: (1) fans should have to pay copyright owners to be allowed
to share their creative works with others, or (2) somebody else should
pay fans for sharing, perhaps other fans. The latter possibility in
theory could offer some successful fans an alternative path to financial
success without "selling out" or conforming their content to the
sexual/political/artistic mainstream. Avoiding option one has been a
fan priority, even though the strategy of embracing noncommerciality
may badly position fans to take advantage of option two, should
option two become a realistic prospect.
Fan culture's focus on noncommerciality makes sense, given that
mass-media content owners are actively looking for new sources of
revenue, and licensing noncommercial works could be reconceived as
part of a business model. The legal analysis of commerciality in fair
use reinforces the felt need to avoid taking money, but it also raises
questions of distributional unfairness. Rap artists made lots of money
from sampling, but then the lawyers showed up: millions of dollars
changed hands and now sampling is either licensed from start to
finish or it is back underground again.
Commerciality, then, is a messy concept, both practically and
ideologically. The complications increase when we add
transformativeness to the mix. What is the meaning of
"transformation" - especially when a work that has been
"transformed" can also be a derivative work to which the copyright
owner has exclusive rights?8 Transformation is generally defined in
fair use doctrine as adding "something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
7See Abigail De Kosnik, Should Fan Fiction Be Free?, 48 CINEMA J. 118 (2009).
8 See 17 U.S.C. § lo1 ("A'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.") (emphasis added).
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message."9 This vague concept has to be put into action in particular
cases, however, and, as the concept of quotation illustrates, assessing
transformativeness can require us to have very detailed aesthetic
theories, even if we don't articulate them.
For text, quotation is barely interesting in fair use law: quoting a
published work in another work is nearly categorically fair use, at least
as long as quotation and paraphrase from a single source don't make
up a substantial portion of the new work.lo Jonathan Lethem, a
prominent writer, recently went so far as to compose an article in
Harper's Magazine, one of the nation's preeminent publications,
entirely made of (unattributed) quotes from other people." He had
little to worry about, because by mixing and matching he created a
powerful argument for the utility of quotation, adding precisely the
new meaning and message that make a transformative use. For
images and video, the law is more confused. Images are powerful, and
lawyers don't know how to deal with them as successfully as they do
with words. Images and video are hard to dissect; they need to be
copied in order to talk about them persuasively, as with the Zapruder
film.12 Yet they also seem expressive and thus deserving of protection
against copying. Changing the context of an image can change its
meaning, but even with a thousand words it can be impossible to
explain how or why. Music is even worse; lawyers simply don't think
well about music. We know music can be subversive, transformative,
political, and all the other things that speech can be, but it's still really
hard to explain why music should count as speech. Without an
9 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
10 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,564 (1985)
(opining that even "substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a
published work or a news account of a speech"); cf. Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair
Use Rescued, 44 UCIA L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1997) ("[T]he right to quote is essential to the
progress of knowledge. 'New ideas' are never wholly new-they use prior ideas as building
blocks, whether by accepting or rejecting them. The debate implicit in this building
process necessitates quotation. Think of history, biography, journalism, commentary,
criticism, scholarly analysis: How could any of these endeavors function without a right to
quote in support of argument?") (footnote omitted).
", Jonathan Lethem, The Ecstasy ofInfluence: A Plagiarism, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 2007, at
59.
12 Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (where Time
Inc. and Abraham Zapruder released both a Life video showing the 1963 J.F.K
assassination and magazine stills of the video, and the defendant incorporated sketches of
these stills into his book about the assassination. Because of the fair use doctrine, the
district court did not find the defendant to be in violation of copyright laws.).
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account of why musical quotations are important-an account that can
be put into the words with which lawyers are most comfortable-
musical fair use issues will continue to seem intractable. Or, more
likely, the concept of musical fair use (outside of parodic lyrics) will be
incomprehensible.
Can we assess transformativeness at all, or do we need to throw up
our hands in despair? I believe that transformativeness can work as a
fair use concept if we are willing to take remix seriously as the
foundation of human culture. I will borrow here from Donna
Haraway's important essay on cyborgs and feminism.13 Ironically, I
can't do justice to her concept here because I'm creating yet another
hybrid by morphing it for my own purposes. Cyborgs mix the
biological and technological, and in that, they are like artists. Most
saliently, cyborgs are like digital artists: melding imagination with bits
and megabytes. In fact, Haraway writes, "[w]e are all chimeras,
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short,
we are cyborgs,"' whether or not we notice how we've outsourced our
memories to our Outlook calendars or any of the other ways in which
human culture is machine culture.
Fan cultures wear their hybridity proudly, mixing commercial and
noncommercial, dominant perspectives and subcultural critiques,
constructing the new out of bits and pieces of the existing world. As
Julie Levin Russo writes of fan videos, such fanworks "celebrate,
critique, and de- or reconstruct mass media in what Anne Kustritz
calls a 'genre commensurate form,' engaging the source via its own
images (along with their webs of intertextual connotation) and visual
language. In many cases, they render queer dimensions of these
sources visible by telling stories of same-sex romance (known as
'slash') through sophisticated viewing and editing techniques.
Whatever their explicit themes and narratives, they represent a queer
form of reproduction that mates supposedly incompatible parents
('original' media source and 'original' creativity) to spawn hybrid
offspring."'5
13 Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in
the Late Twentieth Century, SOCIALIST REVIEw (reprinted and updated in SIMIANS,
cORGS AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE, 149 (Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1991)).
14d. at 150.
15 Julie Levin Russo, User-Penetrated Content: Fan Video in the Age of Convergence, 48
CINEMA J. 125, 126 (2009) (citations omitted).
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In a cyborg world, meaning is always changing, circulating,
negotiating. The cyborg is built on contradictions, which she
transmutes into complexities. This is a helpful metaphor because one
challenge of defending women's fanworks before the law is to protect
them from charges of over-investment, incoherence, or
unintelligibility from outside. As one fan writes, building a gift culture
that is fundamentally entwined with mass, consumer culture can be
hard to understand from the dominant perspective:
[N]on-fans. . . see all this effort, all the work that goes
into fanwork, and they are so immersed in the invisible
reality of capitalist thinking, that they honestly can't
conceptualise that people might genuinely not give a
shit about selling that work for money. They can't
understand an economy of giving things away or
sharing. They think it has to be lip-service, that there's
a secret agenda ...
But what I think makes the chasm even harder to
bridge is that from the outside, fandom looks like it is
all about consuming-because, in part, that's exactly
what it is. Consumption is this great paradox that fans
wrap their heads around without too many problems-
we have a gift economy, yes, but it is built around
buying primary texts, tie-in merchandise, franchised
goods and services. For the most part we don't even
blink at negotiating these two ideologies; I mean, we
live with multiple realities in our fanfiction every day,
so believing a dozen contradictory things before eating
our Star Wars Special Edition Cornflakes is what we're
trained for ....
To the non-fandom side, however, it makes no sense at
all. It looks like hypocrisy, I suspect, rather than living
in a multiple-choice culture. Capitalism talks a good
talk about supply and demand, but is too focused on
the next big hit to really mean it: you can have any
colour as long as it's black.
This is why I've come around to the idea that valuing
something without a monetary price-tag is one of the
2olo]1
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most subversive everyday acts now possible in
capitalist culture.16
Lawyers, and especially judges, may not easily understand the context
of remix cultures like media fandom, in which each contribution
enters into a community with various traditions, expectations and
understandings, so that layers of meaning may only be apparent to
people already familiar with the subject, or at least the aesthetics of
the community. If the standard aesthetic response of lawyers is "I
know art when I see it," the way Potter Stewart knew obscenity when
he saw it, then we need to add Catharine MacKinnon's response to
Stewart: you need to "[know] what I know when I see what I see."'7
To the extent that we are all hybrids, built out of pieces of the world
that we've incorporated into ourselves, the apparent contradiction in
building on mass culture and making something non-mass out of it
will be easier to manageJ 8
Hybridity also implies a relationship to the previous generation
that isn't univocal. A hybrid is neither out to destroy its predecessors
nor to keep perfect faith with them. This is a useful model for remix
culture, especially fanworks, where the relationship to the mass media
source is often complicated. Many fanworks don't fit the prototypical
fair use of biting, mocking criticism that targets aspects of the original
in order to reject them. And this is a strength, not a weakness:
approaching a mass media work with an understanding of what makes
it attractive makes it much easier to communicate with other people
who like it as well. Those people are the ones most in need of
commentary on it. Indeed, even the canonical transformative uses
aren't pure rejections of their sources/targets: neither 2 Live Crews
Pretty Woman'9 nor Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone20 ignore
what was attractive about the original.
6 Cupid's Bow, http://cupidsbow.livejournal.com/2664o5.html (Dec. 15, 2007, 22:42
UTC).
'7Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 2o HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1985).
18 See Haraway, supra note 13, at 149 (calling her project ironic, because irony "is about
contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension
of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true").
19 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (reversing a ruling against
fair use when 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman" copied the most recognizable musical element
and the first line of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman").
8
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Alice Randall in particular made quite clear that she wrote her
version of Gone With the Wind because the original had been so
powerful for her personally, not just because it had been key to
popular images of the antebellum South. Randall's account of how
she came to write The Wind Done Gone is a familiar one in fandom:
love mixed with pain, and a decision to rewrite the story to make it
better for herself. Indeed, Randall begins her explanation of why she
wrote the book with a different mass media fandom, to which she had
the same kind of intense, mixed reaction:
When I was a girl of six or seven I fell in love with the
television series Batman. And like many loves, there
was something I hated in it too: I hated the fact that no
one who looked like me was in the story. For two
weeks after that awareness I was frustrated. The third
week I wrote myself in. I literally began to write out
Batman scripts and write a part for me into them, a Bat
Girl part. My Bat Girl wasn't a sidekick; she was a
catalyst; every time I wrote her into a story, she
changed its ending ...
Later, when I read Gone With the Wind (GWTW), I fell
in love with another pop culture artifact. This was a
troubled love from the beginning. I had to overlook
racist stereotyping and Klan whitewashing to
appreciate the ambitious, resilient, hardworking, hard-
loving character who is Scarlett. Like so many others, I
managed to do it. Then one day, rereading the novel,
an enormous question arose for me from the center of
the text. Where are the mulattos on Tara? Where is
Scarlett's half-sister? Almost immediately I knew I had
to tell her story, tell the story that hadn't been told.
Tell it because the silence injured me.21
20 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin CO., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (vacating a
lower court's ruling, which granted a temporary restraining order and permanent
injunction against the publication of an allegedly copyright-infringing book, because the
ruling violated the First Amendment).
21 A Conversation with Alice Randall,
http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/readers-uides/windonegoneindex2.shtml#
conversation (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
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As Randall's experience illustrates, the prototype of transformative
fair-use-as-attack turns out to require flattening out the examples
used to populate the category.
Once we recognize the richness and multidimensionality of
transformativeness, we can assess fair use claims more usefully,
paying attention to the way a new remix fits into its broader context.
We need not require a direct assault to recognize that a work has
added a new meaning worthy of protection as a fair use. Drawing on
Carol Gilligan's concepts of moral maturity, based on studies of
certain women's moral reasoning, I would argue that copyright's
theory of creativity must value both independence (respect for dissent
and for new messages) and connection (respect for community and for
connections drawn between works).22
A cyborg's work is never finished, its boundaries never entirely
certain. Against a high-protectionist version of copyright that insists
on ever-lengthening copyright terms and moral rights against
alteration of a work in unfavorable ways, cyborg fluidity insists that
borders between works matter because they are permeable. For
example, we have seven Harry Potter books which have inspired over
a hundred thousand Harry Potter stories by fans; neither the books
nor the fanworks exist as entirely separate artifacts, but all are
embedded in a broader culture. Asserting their creative independence
and their creative embeddedness at the same time-their basis in, and
distinctions from, the commercial economy-fanworks offer a working
model of hybridity in creative production, one the law would do well
to recognize. It's no accident that Haraway invokes rewriting as a
central characteristic of her productive cyborgs:
Contests for the meanings of writing are a major form
of contemporary political struggle. Releasing the play
of writing is deadly serious. The poetry and stories of
US women of colour are repeatedly about writing,
about access to the power to signify . . . . Cyborg
writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis
of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the
tools to mark the world that marked them as other.
The tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that
reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of
22 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
[Vol. 6: 11o0
TUSHNET
naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories,
cyborg authors subvert the central myths of origin of
Western culture.23
This brings me back to the question of whether we ought to care about
remix and remixers. Remix culture often has to fight off the intuition
that free speech, to be really respectable, ought to be political, at least
in the general sense of operating as social criticism even if it doesn't
intervene in electoral politics. What's so important about remixing a
favorite TV show to demonstrate how two characters are meant for
each other?
I will set aside the valuation of engagement in popular culture as
obviously less than engagement in "real" life. But even if we only care
about what people do in the political sphere, the presence of remix
culture is a vital indicator of the health of our discourse. The process
of speaking produces more speakers? Alice Randall began with
Batman; her experimentation empowered her to take on Scarlett
O'Hara and race relations. My own experience with blogging is
another case in point: I was never a particularly shy speaker. But once
I started blogging regularly, I became a lot more confident that
everyone was entitled to my opinion. And my posts are, largely,
derivative works: I summarize and discuss recent cases and talks I
attend. Writing the summaries led me to realize that I had opinions
on the contents, and I added those in.
For people who aren't sure they have things to say, the experience
of actually saying things and getting feedback is liberating. "Who do
you think you are?" is most often a question asked to suppress
contribution. Sometimes it doesn't even need to be asked, because
people have already internalized the message that they aren't worth
23 Haraway, supra note 13, at 175.
24 See Balkin, supra note 1, at 35 ("A democratic culture is valuable because it gives
ordinary people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation and evolution of the
processes of meaning-making that shape them and become part of them; a democratic
culture is valuable because it gives ordinary people a say in the progress and development
of the cultural forces that in turn produce them .... When people are creative, when they
make new things out of old things, when they become producers of their culture, they
exercise and perform their freedom and become the sort of people who are free."); Robert
S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case That Started from a Parody: American
Intellectual Property and the Pursuit ofDemocratic Ideals in Modern China, 16 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 237, 258-59 (2009) (discussing the profound political effects of making remix
video on Chinese youth, who learn to see themselves as democratic agents; noting that
"[t]his popular consciousness has the potential to expand beyond cultural matters alone,
into a burgeoning political consciousness, or perhaps even activism").
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listening to. People define themselves by what they know and what
they love (and sometimes by what they hate). Making a creative work,
especially a creative work that comments on an artifact that other
people will know and have opinions about, gives people their own
answers to that question, and empowers them to keep talking. These
capabilities are the backbone of a culture of creativity and
critical/analytical discourse that is worth propagating and preserving.
Who do you think you are?
